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The Jurisprudence of Desegregation: 
Understanding the Recent Busing Developments 
In the twenty-eight years since the Supreme Court 
decided Brown v. Board of Education,l school desegration has 
undergone a series of legal and social changes. The most 
recent of these changes has been a flood of anti-busing 
sentiment in the courts and legislatures. 2 A further indi-
1347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
2Among the most noteworthy developments: 
a) Amendment No. 1250, titled the "Neighborhood School Act 
of 1982" which states that "assignment of students to public 
schools closest to their residence (neighborhood public 
schools) is the preferred method of public school attendance" 
for the reason that "court orders requiring transportation of 
students to or attendence at public schools others than the 
one closest to their residence for the purpose of achieving 
racial balance or racial desegregation have proven to be 
ineffective remedies to achieve unitary school systems." This 
amendment, which was approved by the U.S. Senate in February, 
1982, also limited injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 was 
amended to provide that: "No Court of the United States may 
order or issue any writ directly or indirectly ordering any 
student to be assigned or transported to a public school other 
than that which is closest to the student's residence .... " 
b) Proposition I, an anti-busing amendment in California 
which provides that there must be a court-determined finding 
of a fourteenth amendment violation before transportation or 
assignment of students may be ordered. For an extensive 
analysis of Proposition I, see, Note, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 
611 (1980). -
c) Initiative 350, a referendum approved by the voters in 
the State of Washington, requires that no student attend a 
school which is not geographically nearest the student's place 
of residence. The constitutionality of Initiative 350 was 
successfully challenged in the District Court of Washington. 
State of Washington v. Seattle School Board, 473 F. Supp. 996 
(1979). The finding of the district court was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 633 F. 2d 1338 (9th 
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, __ U.S. __ , 102 S.Ct. 384 
(1981) . 
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cation of this new development has been the U. S. Justice 
Department's refusal to support the N.A.A.C.P. in a desegre-
gation case for the first time since 1954. 3 
While anti-desegregation sentiment is hardly a new 
phenomenon since BroWll,4 the vociferousness of those oppos-
ing busing is new, as is the support they are receiving 
nationwide. 
This sentiment is most simply explained as either a 
reflection of the Reagan Administration's conservative 
c.... 
stance, or as a return to the blatant racism of an earlier 
era. These explanations, however, are too facile for a 
legal issue of such complexity. While these new develop-
ments seem extreme, they may not indicate disapproval of 
integration as much as dissatisfaction with busing as an 
effective means of accomplishing integration. 
One would hope that the last twenty-eight years have 
not produced a mere series of busing regulations, but have 
established certain ideals about equality wi thin both the 
legal and social systems. To focus solely on the current 
3In Seattle School Board, 633 F.2d 1338, the Justice Department 
supported the N.A.A.C.P. in the district court and Court of Appeals. 
Justice changed its position in its memorandum to the Supreme Court: 
"While the United States argued in the lower courts that such an initia-
tive was unconstitutional, we have reconsidered that position since the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. We disagree with the majority below 
and its holding that Initiative 350 is unconstitutional." Memorandum 
for the Justice Department at 6. 
4 See, ~, Farley, School Integration and White Flight, (Brookings 
Institution Symposium, August, 1975); McKay, With All Deliberate Speed, 
31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956); Carter, Reexaming Brown Twenty-Five Years 
Later, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615, 620 (1979) (hereinafter cited as 
Carter). 
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section I 
The Theoretical Framework 
a. The "irreducible" concepts 
In the historical perspective, it is first important to 
focus on what have remained "irreducible" concepts, those 
concepts which have a basic element of truthfulness and 
rightness about them. This rightness allows them to form 
the foundations of the law, irrespective of the changes or 
fluctuations to which they are subjected. Such concepts are 
what H. L.A. Hart terms the "minimum content of Natural 
Law. liS While Hart is referring to the law in general, 
certain concepts have emerged in this particular area to 
serve as the minimum content for equal protection in deseg-
regation. 
The minimum content in the area of desegregation con-
sists of four concepts. The first is that no race is super-
ior or inferior to another race. Race is not a factor in 
equality. 6 Second, it is inhereatly wrong for the Govern-
ment to impose or encourage racial segregation among its 
citizens. 7 The third concept is that racism is a pernicious 
5H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 188-189 (1961) (Stating that: 
"Universally recognized concepts which have a basis in elementary truths 
concerning human beings, their natural environment, and aims, may be 
considered the minimum content of Natural Law."). 
6 Brown, 347 U.S. 483; and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
7 See generally, Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Brown v. Board of Education 
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948) . 
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evil which has no place in ou~ society.S The fourth is the 
recogni tion that there is a need for a minimum level of 
cooperation in order to make these ideals effective. 9 These 
four concepts have remained the underlying ideals throughout 
the political and judicial fluctuations since Brown. 
b. The dialectical process 
The history of desegregation may be characterized as a 
series of steps forward in race relations until recently, 
when the events have "taken a giant step backwards. 11 10 The 
simplicity of this idea is appealing, but it is misleading. 
Conceptually, the current conflict in this area stems from 
two opposed ideals or visions which form the respective 
poles of a dialectical structure. 
The dialectic begins with a thesis, a theory which is 
accorded general acceptance. OVer the course of time, this 
original theory undergoes incremental changes, additions, 
and inquiries into its validity. The thesis is slowly 
eroded and eventually replaced by an entirely new thesis, or 
the antithesis. From these two extremes, a synthesis 
emerges. This synthesis is a new theory premised on the 
fundamental concepts gleaned from both thesis and antithesis. 
8 See Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430 
(1968); and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 
i ('1971). See also Carter, supra note 4, at 618. 
9U.S. Steelworkers v. Webber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); and P1essy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) . See also Goodman, The Desegregation 
Dilemma: A Vote for Voluntarism, 19~WASH. U. L. Q. 407. 
10Mi11iken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Professor Duncan Kennedy of Harvard Law School posits 
that there are two opposed modes for dealing with substan-
tive issues in legal disputes: altruism and individualism. II 
In the area of desegregation, the ideals of altruism and 
individualism are conceptual end-points on a continuum which 
form the respective poles of the dialect~cal structure. 
Altruism is defined by Kennedy as lithe belief that one ought 
not to indulge a sharp preference for one's own interest 
over those of others. 1I12 In short, altruism emphasizes the 
importance of the common good. The opposed concept, indivi-
dualism, is described as making a IIsharp distinction between 
one's interests and those of others, combined with the 
belief that a preference in conduct for one's own interest 
is legitimate, but that one should be willing to respect the 
~ 
rules that make it possible to co-exist with others similar-
ly self-interested.,,13 
The history of racial inequality in this country and 
the legal response thereto has been characterized by the 
problem of achieving and maintaining a balanced tension 
between two ideals. One ideal encourages an individual's 
freedom to make choices; the other encourages behavior in 
furtherance of the common good. 
llKennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Ad 'udication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy. 
12Id . at 1717 (emphasis in original). 
13Id . at 1713. 
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The Supreme Court's stance on desegregation has been 
like a pendulum, swinging from the individualistic Plessy 
F 14 d . . th It . . d .. f v. erguson eC1S10n to e a rU1st1c eC1S10n 0 Brown. 
The trend from Plessy to Brown to the present will be exam-
ined against this theoretical framework in order to deter-
mine whether a synthesis is emerging from this dialectic, or 
whether a series of pendulum shifts is still occuring. 
Section II 
The Historical Spiral of Desegregation 
In the 1896 Plessy decision, the Supreme Court estab-
lished the well-known "separate but equal" doctrine. "We 
cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the 
separation of the two races in public conveyances isunrea-
sonable .. Plessy arose from a constitutional chal-
lenge to an 1890 Louisiana law that required "equal but 
separate" accomodations for "white" and "colored" railroad 
passengers. Many of the theoretical ideals of Plessy were 
premised on notions of individualistic liberty: 
The argument [against segregation] also assumes that social 
prejudice may be overcome by legislation, and that equal 
rights cannot be secured to the Negro except by enforced 
commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this propo-
sition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social 
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a 
mutual appreciation of Igach other's merits and a voluntary 
consent of individuals. 
14163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
15 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-551. 
16 Id . at 551 (emphasis supplied). It is interesting to note that 
while the Court speaks of "voluntary consent," this was virtually impos-
sible because of the segregation statutes which forbade most forms of 
public commingling. See,~, infra note 18. 
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As long as there were two separate facilities, there were no 
further constitutional requirements. Plessy established the 
minimum requirements of the mandate of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Once this boundary had been established, there was 
still a wide realm in which discrimination could occur, as 
Plessy did not define equality in qualitative terms but 
rather in quantitative ones. 
To the modern reader Plessy is unacceptable because of 
its thinly veiled racism. But it is easy to lose sight of 
the fact that this standard was the national norm, not only 
at the time it was written, but for many years thereafter. 17 
Plessy was not shocking in its era; society had accepted 
that the government supported the white citizen's right to 
do as he wished. The Court was not ready to enforce com-
mingling of the races on the altruistic proposition that 
social prejudice should be corrected. 
Following Plessy, and even as recently as the 1940's, 
school officials were allowed to deny minorities entrance to 
white schools. In fact, they were often required to do so 
by statute. 18 The Court slowly began to limit the broad 
language of Plessy, however, and began to define what con-
stituted equality in more substantive terms. 
17See Carter, supra note 4, at 616. (Stating that: II [B) latant , open, 
raw, racism, churlish and uncivilized, was a fact of life in the 
South .... "). 
18 See , ~, 70 Okla. Stat. (1941) §§ 455, 456, 457 which made it a 
misdemeanor to maintain or operate, teach or attend a school at which 
both whites and blacks were enrolled or taught. 
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The first attack on Plessy occured in Missouri ex reI 
Gaines v. Canada, 19 in which the Court held that Missouri 
had acted unconstitutionally when it denied a black student 
entrance to an all white law school and advised him to apply 
to black schools in adjacent states. The Court determined 
that Missouri's action did not fulfill the requirements of 
"separate but equal." 
Nearly ten years later, another assault was made on the 
separate but equal doctrine, which resulted in a formidable 
limitation on the state's freedom to discriminate. In 
Sweatt v. painter,20 a black applicant to the University of 
Texas Law School was denied entrance solely on the basis of 
race and subseqUently sued the school officials. The state 
trial court held that denying him a legal education while 
granting it to others deprived him of the guarantees of tne 
fourteenth amendment. Rather than grant admission, the 
court allowed the state six months in which to provide equal 
facilities. The petitioner brought suit after the facility 
was built, claiming the new black law school was not equal 
to the University of Texas school. The Supreme Court agreed, 
holding, "we cannot find substantial equality in the educa-
tional opportunities offered white and black law students by 
the state.,,2l It is particularly interesting that the Court 
for the first time did not limit itself to a superficial 
19305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
20339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
21Id . at 633. 
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quantitative comparison of respective facilities (e.g. that 
each had a library, student publications and classrooms). 
Rather a qualitative comparison was made,22 and the schools 
were determined to be unequal. The Court did not rest with 
its finding of inequality of resources but went on to dis-
cuss the intangible aspects of equality: 
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and 
practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the indivi-
duals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few 
students and no one who has practiced law would choose to 
study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of 
ideas a~ the exchange of views with which the law is con-
cerned. 
sweatt is crucial for two reasons. First, the Court 
limited the boundary of individualistic freedom to discri-
minate by giving substance to the meaning of the word 
tlequal." No longer did the existence of a separate facility 
necessarily imply its equality. If the facilities were to 
be separate and equal, they each must have the same number 
and quality of opportunities. Second, the Court recognized 
that the intangible aspects of equality -- interaction and 
sense of community -- were perhaps even more crucial. 
The companion case to Sweatt, McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 24 further emphasized this IIquintessense" of 
equality. McLaurin involved a black student at the univer-
sity of Oklahoma Graduate School who was forced to sit apart 
22See Strickman, ~c:...~ooI 0.':;('8 ... ·8"t it'll at~h~ .. Crossroads, 70 NW. U.L. 
REV. 725, 732 (1976) (Slal ill~ lhllt: "Nt·asII1·ablt' inequality simply meant 
Constitutional violation.") 
23Sweatt, 339 U.s. at. 634. 
24 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
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in a designated seat in class, in the library, and in the 
lunch room. The Court found this decidedly unacceptable, 
not because the facilities were unequal, but because the 
blatant separation must have forced the student to feel 
unequal. The argument that the other students would "volun-
tarily segregate II was not persuasive to the Court: ."There 
is a vast difference -- a Constitutional difference 
between restrictions imposed by the state which prohibit the 
intellectual commingling of students, and the refusal of 
individuals to commingle where the state presents no such 
bar. 11 25 The language of these two cases indicates the 
Court's recognition of the realities of racism inherent in 
the separate but equal doctrine. 
sweatt and McLaurin stand as a pivotal point between 
the respective poles of individualism and altruism. Cases 
such as these are jurisprudentially significant, as they 
indicate the changing attitude of the Court. In these cases 
the Court first recognized that it was not the difference in 
facilities that was really at issue, but that the separate 
but equal doctrine was symptomatic of the "greater and more 
pernicious disease -- white supremacy. 11 26 While Sweatt and 
McLaurin can be viewed in retrospect as timid steps in 
achieving desegregation, they were highly significant in 
laying the foundation for Brown. What was still necessary 
25Id . at 641. See also Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13-14, which struck down 
raciaIIy motivated housing convenants. 
26 • Carter, supra note 4, at 618. 
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was a specific overruling of the Plessy doctrine. 
In 1954, the legal history of race relations changed 
dramatically when the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board 
of Education. In Brown, a black student had sought the 
district court's assistance in gaining admission to a public 
school on a non-segregated basis, which the court refused to 
do. On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court 
and explicitly overruled Plessy: "We conclude that in the 
field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but 
equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal. ,,27 The Court held that the school's 
refusal to admit the plaintiff depri ved him of the equal 
protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. 28 
Brown stirred up not only a societal hornet's nest, but 
a legal one as well. 29 Yet looking back to Brown, the 
decision was clearly the next step on the continuum. Brown 
was the embodiment of an altruistic decision. The sphere of 
freedom to discriminate established in Plessy was eradicated 
27 Brown, 347 u.s. at 495. 
28The Court's reliance on psychological and sociological data as a 
basis for proving inequality has been subject to a great deal of discus-
sion and criticism. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 
(1955); J. COLEMAN ETAt., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 313 
(1966); K.B. Clark, The ~segregation Cases, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224 (1959). 
29Legal Realism, a relatively new school in jurisprudence, underwent 
a crisis in its foundation because of Brown. See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS 
IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973). According to one-commentator, since legal 
realists believed that "law reflects social forces, it was neither 
desirable nor possible for it to serve as a catalyst for social change." 
Horwitz, The Juris rudence of Brown and the Dilemma of Liberalism, 14 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599, 02 1979 hereinafter acited as Horwitz]. 
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in Brown. Instead, there was a specific mandate which 
forbade discriminatory action and rules were imposed which 
allowed no room for discretion. After Brown, no vestiges of 
this realm of discriminatory action established nearly sixty 
years earlier would remain. In Brown, the antithetical 
ideal to Plessy was established. Plessy was quite individu-
alistic, and Brown was highly altruistic. 
Those in favor of Brown at the time did not view it as 
an altruistic decision but as the only equitable solution. 
To put blacks on equal footing with whites, the two races 
had to be commingled educationally. If this social-poli-
tical objective could be accomplished only by legal mandate, 
then that would be the route followed. 3D 
More than twenty-five years later, the persuasiveness 
of this idea is not as easily accepted. The seemingly clear 
solution Brown provided has resulted in a myriad of complex-
ities and transformations. 
The first and logically sequential problem that arose 
was the issue of enforcing Brown. Al though the Supreme 
Court had found segregation unconstitutional, there was no 
rush to desegregate. Brown was, in fact, ignored on a large 
scale. 31 The reluctance to comply led to Brown v. Board of 
30It is hardly uncoDlllon in the United States to resort to a legal 
forum in order to settle social controversy. According to certain 
cOllDllentators, American have always had a penchant for solving their 
social dileDlllas in this manner. See TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 
89-103 (F. Bowen trans. 1956), (ls~d. Paris 1835). 
31See McKay, supra, note 4; and Bickel, A Decade of School Desegrega~ 
tion, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964). 
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Education I I, the implementation decision. 32 Brown II 
imposed the duty of making a "prompt and reasonable start 
toward full compliance II 33 with desegregation and directed 
the district courts to enforce this mandate "wi th all deli-
berate speed. 1I34 This remedial approach to desegregation 
emphasized that rules had been established and not merely 
suggested guidelines. 
It was not until 1968 that the Court heard the next 
major case on desegregation. In Green v. County School 
Board of New Kent county,35 a "freedom of choice" plan came 
before the Court. The plan permitted students to choose 
between attending a previously all-black school (George W. 
Watkins School) or a previously all-white one (New Kent 
School). In the three years prior to 1968, no white student 
had enrolled in the Watkins school and only fifteen percent 
of the blacks had enrolled in New Kent. There was no evi-
dence that the state had tried to coerce children into 
attending one school or another, yet a unanimous court found 
this unconstitutional. Likewise, the Court was straight-
forward in its emphasis on II de facto II segregation; if the 
school was segregated, there was no need to determine if , 
there had been segregative intept. II I f the means prove 
effective, freedom of choice is acceptable, but if it fails 
32349 u.s. 294 (1955) . 
33Id . at 300. 
34Id . at 301. 
35391 U.S. 430 (1968) . 
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______ " _____ ... ......... .R&.I' "V~ ""''' t.JVU.t<.ftAlI 
to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve 
this end.,,36 
By its insistence that "segregated is unconstitution-
al," the court allowed no room for justification, mitigation 
or explanation. At this point purification of the motive 
was not a goal; only the effectiveness of the pian was 
important. Looking back to 1968, the question is whether 
Green had gone beyond the altruism point on the a1 truism-
individualism continuum, and entered into the realm of 
"saintliness. ,,37 Individualists would probably answer this 
question in the affirmative. However, the altruist response 
is that the highly individualistic members of society are 
unwilling to make adjustments because they place too great a 
premium on personal choice and freedom. But in a society 
where personal choice and freedom are highly valued, the 
denial of personal freedom is not readily accepted. 
In 1971, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
36 Id . at 440, quoting Bowman v. County. School Board, 382 F .2d 326, 
333 (4th Cir. 1967), (Sobeloff, J., concurring). 
. 37Xennedy, in his article Form and Substance, supra note 11, at 1718, l describes "saintliness" as an area in which all individual pursuit is 
I subsumed by concern for the common good. This involves too much effort I and expense without adequate justification. Saintliness is not accept-able to society, nor is the extreme of individualism, that which Kennedy 
I terms "egotism." Egotism rest on the assumption that it is "impossible 
I and undesirable to set any limits at all on the pursuit of self-interest.' 
i Id. at 1715. 
, Both individualism and altruism are functional concepts as end-
l points on a continuum. When they exceed these endpoints and venture 
11 into the respective realms of egotism and saintliness, they become 
. socially unworkable positions. See also Katz, Boundary Theory, 28 
BUFFALO L. REV. 383 (1979). 
, . 
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tion came before the Court. 38 Swann involved the pairing of 
inner-ci ty black schools with outlying white schools and 
some busing of children in both directions. This plan, 
fashioned by the district court, was upheld by the Supreme 
Court, as was the use of mathmetical ratios as a starting 
point to eliminate segregated schools. The historical 
significance of Swann is that the Court began to shift its 
focus from effect (i. e. Green) to intent to segregate. 
Swann indicates that there may be more to consider than the 
effectiveness of the plan: 
[I)t should be clear the the existence of some small number 
of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a dis-
trict is not in and of itself the mark of a system which 
still practices segregation by law .... j [But) the court 
should scrutinize such schools, and the burden upon the 
school authorities will be to satisfy the court that their 
racial composition is not the res~gt of present or past 
discriminatory act] on on their part. 
Although Swann seemed merely to be adding to what had been 
established by the Court in previous decisions, it was 
actually a retreat from the unequivocal language of Green. 
From Swann forward, the Court seemed to indicate that there 
might be room to consider factors other than effect. 
One year later, the Court handed down its first non-
unanimous decision in Wright v. Council of the City of 
Emporia. 40 As mentioned previously, the Court in Green had 
38402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
39 Id . at 26. 
40407 U.S. 451 (1972). The companion case to Emporia was United 
States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, 407 U.S. 48 (1972). 
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eliminated the sphere of discretionary behavior by focusing 
solely on effect. Al though this focus might have been 
necessary for desegregation to be functional, it was not 
given continued support by the Court. The first rumblings 
of discontent are hinted at in Swann. In Emporia, they are 
openly expressed. 
In this case, the city of Emporia tried to establish 
its own school system separate from that of the surrounding 
area of Greensville County. The pre-separation ratio of 
county-ci ty schools was 66 percent black and 34 percent 
white. If the separation were adopted, the result would be 
a city ratio of 48 percent white, 52 percent black and a 
county ratio of 72 percent black and 28 percent white. In a 
five-to-four decision, the majority found this plan consitu-
tionally unacceptable. The City's argument was that while 
race might have been an "ancillary" factor in the plan, the 
real aim of the program was to provide quality education. 
This position, a novel one, was flatly rejected: "This 
'dominant purpose' test finds no precedent in our deci-
sions.,,41 Furthermore, the Court reasserted that an inquiry 
into racial motive may be made concerning a non-racial 
justification, such as the "quality education" argument made 
by the City of Emporia. The Court noted, however, that a 
permissible purpose alone will not justify an impermissible 
effect: 
The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate schools, and we 
have said that "the measure of any desegregation plan is its 
41Emporia, 407 u.s. at 461. 
125 
effectiveness". . . . Thus, we have focused on the effect--
not the purpose or motivation -- of a school board's action 
in determining whether 4ft is a permissible method of dis-
mantling a dual system. 
What makes Emporia especially noteworthy is Chief Justice 
Burger's dissent. The Chief Justice highlighted Emporia's 
desire to provide a higher quality of education. He did not 
believe there was any racial motive by the city: "The modest 
difference between the racial composition of Emporia's 
proposed separate school system and that of the county dS a 
whole affords no basis for an inference of racial motiva-
tion. ,,43 Furthermore, he found that the statistical compo-
si tion which would result from Emporia's plan would ade-
quately meet constitutional requirements, and found fault 
with the majority's emphasis on statistical results: "Obses-
sion with such minor statistical differences reflects the 
gravely mistaken view that a plan providing more consistent 
racial ratios is somehow more unitary than one which toler-
ates a lack of racial balance. ,,44 Since Brown I I, however, 
the Court has been emphatic about not tolerating a lack of 
racial balance. The last paragraph of the dissent indicates 
that the retreat from Green's unequivocal and overly altru-
istic stance has begun: 
Read as a whole, this record suggests that the District 
Court, acting before our decision in Swann, was reaching for 
some hypothetical perfection in racial balance, rather than 
the elimination of a dual school system. To put it in the 
simplest terms, the Court, in adopting the District Court's 
42Id . at 462. 
43Id . at 483. 
44Id . at 474. 
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approach, goes too far. 
The dissent marks not only the beginning of a trend away 
from the altruistic position, but also the emergence of the 
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. By 
making this distinction more clear, the four dissenters 
shifted the focus from effect to cause. 
The developing distinction came to the forefront in the 
first case of northern desegregation, Keyes v. School Dis-
trict No. 1. 46 Unlike the previous cases, there was no 
statutory or state-imposed dual system. The Court held that 
something more than de facto segregation had to be shown. 
The concept of "intent to segregate," first enunciated in 
Swann, became of great importance in Keyes. "We emphasize 
that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation 
and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in 
Swann is purpose or intent to segregate. ,,47 Although the 
burden was heavily on the school board to prove this lack of 
intent, the Court had made it clear that the focus of Green 
had decidedly shifted. Justice Powell articulates this in 
his concurrence: 
Unwilling and footdragging as the process of desegregation 
was in most places, substantial progress toward achieving 
integration has been made in the Southern States. No com-
parable progress has been made in many nonsouthern cities 
with large minority populations, primarily because of the de 
45Id . at 474 (emphasis supplied). 
46413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
47 Id . at 208 (emphasis in original). 
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facto/de jure distinction nurtured by the courts and accept-
ed complacently by many of the same voices ~~ich denounced 
the evils of segregated schools in the South. 
Since Keyes, the change in focus from effect to intent 
has been rapid. In the 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley,49 
the Court found that an interdistrict remedy to eliminate a 
segregated system was improper when the violation was not 
interdistrict. The Chief Justice, writing for the majority, 
insisted that the remedy exceeded the scope of the constitu-
tional wrong: II wi thout an interdistrict violation and an 
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong 
calling for an interdistrict remedy.IISO This seems to be a 
rather weak basis for the decision. The mandate of Brown II 
to desegregate did not provide for qualifications of dis-
tance. If the city of Detroit were heavily one race and the 
outlying areas another, desegregation could only be achieved 
through an interdistrict remedy. In Milliken, the Court 
clearly retreated from the altruism of Brown and moved 
toward a much more individualistic ideal. The majority of 
the Court would not force the public to go this far in 
sacrificing their personal autonomy for the "common good. II 
Justice Marshall states this in his dissent: 
[P]ublic opposition, no matter how strident, cannot be 
permitted to divert this Court from the enforcement of the 
constitutional principles at issue in this case. Today's 
holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public 
48Id . at 218-219. 
49418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
SOld. at 745. 
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mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of equal 5lustice than it is the product of 
neutral principles of law. 
Justice Marshall squarely addresses the issue of public 
sentiment and its effect on a subject which is so contro-
versial. Despi te the cloak of neutrality which the Court 
seeks to assume, it is integrally involved in society and by 
the very nature of this involvement, it is an impossible 
task for the Court to "neutrally" enforce the Consti tu-
tion. 52 Neither, Brown nor Milliken was a "neutral" inter-
pretations of the Constitution. Both decisions reflected a 
common sentiment in society that the prevailing legal posi-
tion was too extreme and needed modification. 
The standard established in Milliken (that the remedy 
may not exceed the violation) was reiterated by Justice Rehn-
quist in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton 1):53 
SlId. at 814 (emphasis supplied). 
52H 't orw~ z, 
capability of 
assumption: 
supra note 29, at 602-603, recognizes that assuming the 
purely neutral constitutional decision making is a false 
[S 1 ince constitutional commands are not self-executing, we 
must abandon the assumption that we can easily distinguish 
between political and non-political, neutral and nonneutral, 
or result-oreinted and principled constitutional decision-
making. . .. To some extent we must evaluate judicial deci-
sion on constitutional questions in light of our own substan-
tive views of justice and not by whether they conform to a 
model of constitutional command applied in a neutral, nonpoli-
tical manner. 
For further analysis of this debate concerning neutrality, see, ~, 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1959); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: 
A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). See also 
D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE, 86-88 (3d ed. 1972). 
53433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
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1I0nly if there has been systemwide impact may there be a 
systemwide remedy.1I 54 There, the Court determined that an 
evidentiary hearing was required on the issue of intent and 
remanded the case. Dayton returned to the Supreme Court 
(Dayton II)55 with a companion case, columbus Board of Edu-
cation v. Penick. 56 In both, the burden of proving the 
system-wide pattern of intentional discrimination was met. 
These two cases seem at first glance to mark a slight change 
in the Court's attitude, yet the cases contain such a vast 
disparity of views and such convoluted language as to pro-
vide little guidance or precedent. 57 Furthermore, they 
require such a rigorous burden of proving segregative intent 
that it would be quite difficult for most plaintiffs to meet 
this burden. 
Whether the Court has achieved any IIprogress II with 
respect to desegregation since Green is questionable. 58 It 
is interesting to compare the language of Green with that of 
Columbus to see the change of focus by the Court. In 
Columbus, the Court found that adherence to an established 
54Id . at 420. 
55 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman II, 443 u.s. 526 (1979). 
56443 u.s. 449 (1979). 
57 One commentator describes the decisions as adding further to the 
"jerry-built edifice of the school desegregation doctrine .... " Kurland, 
Brown v. Board of Education was the Beginning, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 309, 
391. This same commentator describes the period from 1954 to 1979 in 
the area of desegregation as "from apostle to apostasy - however short 
lived - to apotheosis in a quarter of a century." Id. at 391-392. 
58 See 118 CONGo REV. 5455, 563-566 (1972) which illustrates the 
segregated character of Northern public schools. 
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policy IIwi th full knowledge of the predictable effects of 
such adherence upon racial imbalance in a school system is 
one factor among many others which may be considered by a 
court in determining whether an inference of segregative 
intent should be drawn. ,,59 This arduous determination of 
motive seems a far cry from the mandate of Green:. liThe 
burden on a school board is to come forward with a plan that 
promises to work, and promises realistically to work now. 11 60 
In light of Milliken and Dayton II, the movement toward 
anti-busing legislation and the Justice Department's new 
position is not surprising. The Court, in its retreat from 
the altruism of Brown, and its movement toward the indivi-
dualism of the recent decisions, has become increasingly 
unwilling to impose a heavy burden on the individual in the 
name of the common good. 
section III 
Conclusion 
In order to determine the significance of the recent 
events in desegregation, it is necessary to start with the 
decision in Plessy, which can be considered as the original 
thesis. As previously noted, Plessy was highly individual-
istic, even lIegotistic.,,61 Over the course of time, there 
were attempts to compromise this extreme decision in such 
59 Columbus, 443 U.S. at 255. 
60Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (emphasis in original). 
61 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1715. 
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cases as Missouri and Sweatt. These attempts to compromise 
the egotistic position established in Plessy eventually 
became so unsatisfactory that the destruction of the Plessy 
doctrine was necessary. The theory of Plessy was rejected 
and replaced with a new thesis, or anti thesis, in Brown. 
The evisceration of a legal doctrine which has no 
longer retained its legitimacy is akin to the process which 
occurs when new discoveries are made and accepted in science. 
In his work, The structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas 
S. Kuhn focuses on this concept: 
[A] new theory, however special its range of application, is 
seldom or never just an increment to what is already known. 
Its assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory 
and the re-evaluation of prior fact, an intrinsically revo-
lutionary process t~ is seldom completed by a single man 
and never overnight~ 
In overruling Plessy, Brown became the new but untested 
thesis. This decision in its "pure" form (Le., not yet 
given a practicable dimension) was altruistic. 
gave the theory this practicable dimension. 
Brown II 
It was not until Green that the theory passed from the 
acceptable boundary of altruism into the realm of "saintli-
ness ... 63 The command of ~ to "come forward with a plan 
that promises to work, and promises realistically to work 
now .. 64 did not leave enough room for individualist freedom. 
62KUHN , STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, (2nd ed. 1970) (emphasis 
supplied) . 
63 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1718. 
64 Green, 391 U.S. at 439. 
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Even though egotism,65 the extreme of individualism, is an 
unacceptable position because it tends to lead to racism and 
, segregation, certain principles of individualistic freedom 
remain deeply rooted in American social, political and 
economic thought. 66 The need for a minimum level of volun-
tary cooperation is necessary to make the theory of Brown 
functional. To maintain Brown as a legitimate theory, it 
was necessary to bring forward from Plessy the notion of the 
"voluntary consent of individuals." 67 
The decisions subsequent to Green, including Swann, 
Emporia, Keyes and Milliken have all been attempts to cur-
tail the II saintliness II of Green. Although these cases may 
look like a retreat from the theory established in Brown, 
they are not, because the principles of fairness and equal 
opportunity in education as secured by the fourteenth amend-
ment and reaffirmed in Brown have been brought forward as 
II irreducible II concepts which are an integral part of our 
system of justice. These notions of justice are also too 
deeply embedded in the legal, social and economic systems to 
be cast aside. 
The "crisis" presently occuring in desegregation is not 
·in the theory established in Brown, but in the practical 
application of that theory which has since occurred. The 
65 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1714-1716. 
66 Id . 
193J) .-
See also J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (Ogden ed. 
67 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
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crisis concerns remedies; the method of desegregation, not 
the concept of it. 
The thesis of Brown will not necessarily crumble in the 
attempt to refine the practical aspects. For as modern 
philosophy has recognized, it is necessary to rigorously 
test a concept to assure its validity, and to determine how 
capable it is of withstanding a crisis in its foundations. 
Martin Heidegger, among others, recognized this as an inte-
gral part of any discipline: 
The level which a science has reached is determined by how 
far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In 
such immanent crises the very relationship between posi-
tively investigative inquiry and those things that are under 
interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. 
Among the various disciplines everywhere today there are 
f~eshlg8 awakened tendencies to put research on new founda-
t~ons. 
It is inaccurate to state that the new wave of anti-
busing sentiment is a return to Plessy. Instead, it is more 
correct to recognize that the history of desegregation has 
been a slow and arduous process of trying to achieve a 
synthesis of the two opposed ideals of altruism and indivi-
dualism. 
societal growth occurs through a dialectical movement 
in many different areas. In the area of education, it may 
be that busing is not the proper means to achieve this lit 
synthesis of the ideals of equal educational opportunity 
with the individual preference in education. 
68M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, 29 (7th ed. Macquarrie and Robinson 
trans. 1962) (emphasis supplied). 
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In the course of time, it is hoped that the dialectical 
structure of growth and development will produce an even 
further refinement of ideas leading to a more just and 
egalitarian society. In his article, "structural Due Pro-
cess, ,,69 Professor Tribe articulates one vision of how 
societal growth occurs: 
[This article] reflects a conception of the compact of 
social life as retaining legitimacy only if dialectically 
related to the generally shared values of the society as it 
develops. And such a con7tption in turn reflects a belief I 
have expressed elsewhere in an evolutionary process of 
growth in human awarness, a multidimensional spiral along 
which society moves successive s'tages, according to the laws 
of motion which themselves undergo transformation as the 
society' h position on the spiral, and hence its character, 
changes. 
In this "evolutionary process of growth in human aware-
ness," we have moved in successive stages, from Plessy to 
Brown to the present. As society has adapted to these 
changes, the character of society has changed. certain 
ideals have replaced others which did not retain their 
legitimacy. These new ideals form the basis for our current 
position on the spiral. It is hoped that these new ideals 
will lead to further understanding of the importance of 
equality and to a society which is concerned enough to make 
these ideals a reality. 
Jane Campbell Moriarty 
69T 'b r~ e, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 
(1975) . 
70 See Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations 
for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L. J. 1315, 1338-1339 (1974). 
71Tribe, supra note 69, at 310. 
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